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Target stock price runup prior to acquisitions

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Date Issued:
2009
Summary:
Information leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition then information leakage is greater. Further if the acquirer is foreign, if the target is a high-tech firm, and if the target has options on its stock all increase information leakage. I find hostile deals are effective in reducing information leakage. Lastly, information leakage increases in the percentage of managerial ownership. I next hypothesize that the identity and intent of partial acquirers is known to market participants before the announcement of a partial acquisition. I find that the market can anticipate whether a partial acquirer intends to fully-acquire or take an active role in the management of the target. Also, the market anticipates whether the acquirer is a private investment find or a non-financial corporation. Further, the acquirer's identity or intent is fully reflected in the target's stock price before the announcement of the partial acquisition. These results help explain why there are few partial acquisitions as precursors to full acquisitions.
Title: Target stock price runup prior to acquisitions.
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Name(s): Brigida, Matthew David.
College of Business
Department of Finance
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Electronic Thesis Or Dissertation
Issuance: monographic
Date Issued: 2009
Publisher: Florida Atlantic University
Physical Form: electronic
Extent: xi, 205 p. : ill.
Language(s): English
Summary: Information leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition then information leakage is greater. Further if the acquirer is foreign, if the target is a high-tech firm, and if the target has options on its stock all increase information leakage. I find hostile deals are effective in reducing information leakage. Lastly, information leakage increases in the percentage of managerial ownership. I next hypothesize that the identity and intent of partial acquirers is known to market participants before the announcement of a partial acquisition. I find that the market can anticipate whether a partial acquirer intends to fully-acquire or take an active role in the management of the target. Also, the market anticipates whether the acquirer is a private investment find or a non-financial corporation. Further, the acquirer's identity or intent is fully reflected in the target's stock price before the announcement of the partial acquisition. These results help explain why there are few partial acquisitions as precursors to full acquisitions.
Summary: I next hypothesize that macroeconomic factors affect information leakage, and may serve as a signal of when to speculate on acquisitions. I find that information leakage is positively related to shocks in both expected economic conditions and financing costs, the latter signaling to speculators that acquisitions are imminent. I also find information about an imminent full acquisition is leaked earlier when there are positive shocks to economic conditions and financing costs.
Identifier: 497062773 (oclc), 368613 (digitool), FADT368613 (IID), fau:4255 (fedora)
Note(s): by Matthew David Brigida.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2009.
Includes bibliography.
Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2009. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Subject(s): Consolidation and merger of corporations
Negotiation in business
Investment analysis
Stocks -- Prices
Securities industry -- Corrupt practices -- United States
Held by: FBoU FAUER
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/FAU/368613
Use and Reproduction: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Host Institution: FAU