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North American Free Trade Agreement as a two-level game and implications for the free trade area of the Americas

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Date Issued:
2005
Summary:
The purpose of this paper is to break through the complexity of the NAFTA negotiations in order to reveal some of the contentious issues from three stages of the NAFTA bargaining process: the fast track agreement, the negotiations under President Bush, Sr., and the side payments under President Clinton. Putnam's two-level game theory will help describe how the interests of business, environmental groups, and labor unions influenced the outcome of the NAFTA through their respective win-sets, domestic and international power relations, and side agreements. Extrapolating from Putnam's model and the success in NAFTA bargaining, we can predict that the ongoing Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations are more likely to succeed if international representatives strategize to create favorable conditions for domestic ratification through understanding the domestic constituencies and win-sets of the players.
Title: The North American Free Trade Agreement as a two-level game and implications for the free trade area of the Americas.
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Name(s): Neubauer, Nicole E.
Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Thesis
Issuance: multipart monograph
Date Issued: 2005
Publisher: Florida Atlantic University
Physical Form: electronic
electronic resource
Extent: viii, 63 leaves : ill.
Language(s): English
Summary: The purpose of this paper is to break through the complexity of the NAFTA negotiations in order to reveal some of the contentious issues from three stages of the NAFTA bargaining process: the fast track agreement, the negotiations under President Bush, Sr., and the side payments under President Clinton. Putnam's two-level game theory will help describe how the interests of business, environmental groups, and labor unions influenced the outcome of the NAFTA through their respective win-sets, domestic and international power relations, and side agreements. Extrapolating from Putnam's model and the success in NAFTA bargaining, we can predict that the ongoing Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations are more likely to succeed if international representatives strategize to create favorable conditions for domestic ratification through understanding the domestic constituencies and win-sets of the players.
Identifier: 309784046 (oclc), 15869 (digitool), FADT15869 (IID), fau:1352 (fedora)
Note(s): by Nicole E. Neubauer.
Typescript (Photocopy).
Thesis (B.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, Honors College, 2005.
Bibliography: leaves 60-63.
Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2005. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Subject(s): North American Free Trade Agreement (1922)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) (1947)
Free trade -- Mexico
Free trade -- North America
Economic development -- Social aspects
United States -- Foreign economic relations -- Caribbean Area
Held by: FBoU FAUER
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/FAU/15869
Use and Reproduction: Copyright © is held by the author, with permission granted to Florida Atlantic University to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Host Institution: FAU

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