You are here

Utilizing a Game Theoretical Approach to Prevent Collusion and Incentivize Cooperation in Cybersecurity Contexts

Download pdf | Full Screen View

Date Issued:
2017
Summary:
In this research, a new reputation-based model is utilized to disincentivize collusion of defenders and attackers in Software Defined Networks (SDN), and also, to disincentivize dishonest mining strategies in Blockchain. In the context of SDN, the model uses the reputation values assigned to each entity to disincentivize collusion with an attacker. Our analysis shows that not-colluding actions become Nash Equilibrium using the reputationbased model within a repeated game setting. In the context of Blockchain and mining, we illustrate that by using the same socio-rational model, miners not only are incentivized to conduct honest mining but also disincentivized to commit to any malicious activities against other mining pools. We therefore show that honest mining strategies become Nash Equilibrium in our setting. This thesis is laid out in the following manner. In chapter 2 an introduction to game theory is provided followed by a survey of previous works in game theoretic network security, in chapter 3 a new reputation-based model is introduced to be used within the context of a Software Defined Network (SDN), in chapter 4 a reputation-based solution concept is introduced to force cooperation by each mining entity in Blockchain, and finally, in chapter 5, the concluding remarks and future works are presented.
Title: Utilizing a Game Theoretical Approach to Prevent Collusion and Incentivize Cooperation in Cybersecurity Contexts.
131 views
21 downloads
Name(s): Golchubian, Arash, author
Nojoumian, Mehrdad, Thesis advisor
Florida Atlantic University, Degree grantor
College of Engineering and Computer Science
Department of Computer and Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Electronic Thesis Or Dissertation
Date Created: 2017
Date Issued: 2017
Publisher: Florida Atlantic University
Place of Publication: Boca Raton, Fla.
Physical Form: application/pdf
Extent: 84 p.
Language(s): English
Summary: In this research, a new reputation-based model is utilized to disincentivize collusion of defenders and attackers in Software Defined Networks (SDN), and also, to disincentivize dishonest mining strategies in Blockchain. In the context of SDN, the model uses the reputation values assigned to each entity to disincentivize collusion with an attacker. Our analysis shows that not-colluding actions become Nash Equilibrium using the reputationbased model within a repeated game setting. In the context of Blockchain and mining, we illustrate that by using the same socio-rational model, miners not only are incentivized to conduct honest mining but also disincentivized to commit to any malicious activities against other mining pools. We therefore show that honest mining strategies become Nash Equilibrium in our setting. This thesis is laid out in the following manner. In chapter 2 an introduction to game theory is provided followed by a survey of previous works in game theoretic network security, in chapter 3 a new reputation-based model is introduced to be used within the context of a Software Defined Network (SDN), in chapter 4 a reputation-based solution concept is introduced to force cooperation by each mining entity in Blockchain, and finally, in chapter 5, the concluding remarks and future works are presented.
Identifier: FA00005950 (IID)
Degree granted: Thesis (M.S.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2017.
Collection: FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection
Note(s): Includes bibliography.
Subject(s): Dissertations, Academic -- Florida Atlantic University
Software-defined networks (Computer network technology)
Blockchain
Cybersecurity
Held by: Florida Atlantic University Libraries
Sublocation: Digital Library
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/fau/fd/FA00005950
Use and Reproduction: Copyright © is held by the author, with permission granted to Florida Atlantic University to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Use and Reproduction: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Host Institution: FAU
Is Part of Series: Florida Atlantic University Digital Library Collections.