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Two Essays on Mutual Funds Herding and the Information Content of Their Trades

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Date Issued:
2018
Abstract/Description:
Information asymmetry literature has developed models that explain the relation between uninformed traders and informed traders. In general, these models have shown that first, information asymmetry is a driving force for investor buying and selling behavior. Second, the trades of informed investors reveal some of the information they possess suggesting that the trades of informed investors are informative to market makers. Third, when information about a stock enters the market, the characteristics of the firm can change, e.g., a better information environment reduces the cost of capital (Admati, 1985; Easley and O‟Hara, 2004; Wang, 1993). In this study, I apply information asymmetry theory to explore the trading behavior of active equity mutual fund managers and their role as facilitators of information. In the first essay, I study the information environment of firms mutual funds choose to add to their holdings and how it changes after the inclusion. I identify all new additions to the mutual fund holdings universe from 2002 to 2015 and compare them to the available universe of firms not yet owned by mutual funds. I find that active equity mutual fund managers behave as informed investors and prefer to buy stocks with more opaque information environments i.e., firms with larger spreads, lower trading volume, smaller firms with more growth opportunities, and firms that tend to use more accruals. Fund managers also show a preference for firms that have less analyst following, those in which analysts are less likely to agree on their EPS estimates, and firms in which analysts are more likely to err in their predictions. In other words, mutual fund managers prefer firms that are more likely to be mispriced. Once the funds include the firms, I document a strong improvement in their information environment. Firms attract more analyst coverage, reduce its use of accruals, produce more guidance, increase their market cap, and show increased turnover. The second essay focuses on the herding behavior of mutual funds. The study is the first to document the herding of mutual fund managers after creation of toehold positions by portfolio managers. I use a hand-collected dataset consisting of all toehold acquisitions reported to the SEC from 1995 to 2015 to document a strong herding reaction of active equity mutual funds after toehold announcements. This herding reaction is several times stronger than other mutual fund herding events reported by previous literature. I also document that the strength of the herding reaction varies depending on the identity of the filer or the characteristics of the firm acquired. The herding reaction is stronger for toehold announcements of firms with a smaller market capitalization, better growth opportunities, and those that are more illiquid. I also find that the herding reaction is weaker after the filings of hedge fund managers. My results support the informational herding cascade hypothesis.
Title: Two Essays on Mutual Funds Herding and the Information Content of Their Trades.
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Name(s): Carrete Rodriguez, Angel Francisco, author
Agapova, Anna, Thesis advisor
Florida Atlantic University, Degree grantor
College of Business
Department of Finance
Type of Resource: text
Genre: Electronic Thesis Or Dissertation
Date Created: 2018
Date Issued: 2018
Publisher: Florida Atlantic University
Place of Publication: Boca Raton, Fla.
Physical Form: application/pdf
Extent: 129 p.
Language(s): English
Abstract/Description: Information asymmetry literature has developed models that explain the relation between uninformed traders and informed traders. In general, these models have shown that first, information asymmetry is a driving force for investor buying and selling behavior. Second, the trades of informed investors reveal some of the information they possess suggesting that the trades of informed investors are informative to market makers. Third, when information about a stock enters the market, the characteristics of the firm can change, e.g., a better information environment reduces the cost of capital (Admati, 1985; Easley and O‟Hara, 2004; Wang, 1993). In this study, I apply information asymmetry theory to explore the trading behavior of active equity mutual fund managers and their role as facilitators of information. In the first essay, I study the information environment of firms mutual funds choose to add to their holdings and how it changes after the inclusion. I identify all new additions to the mutual fund holdings universe from 2002 to 2015 and compare them to the available universe of firms not yet owned by mutual funds. I find that active equity mutual fund managers behave as informed investors and prefer to buy stocks with more opaque information environments i.e., firms with larger spreads, lower trading volume, smaller firms with more growth opportunities, and firms that tend to use more accruals. Fund managers also show a preference for firms that have less analyst following, those in which analysts are less likely to agree on their EPS estimates, and firms in which analysts are more likely to err in their predictions. In other words, mutual fund managers prefer firms that are more likely to be mispriced. Once the funds include the firms, I document a strong improvement in their information environment. Firms attract more analyst coverage, reduce its use of accruals, produce more guidance, increase their market cap, and show increased turnover. The second essay focuses on the herding behavior of mutual funds. The study is the first to document the herding of mutual fund managers after creation of toehold positions by portfolio managers. I use a hand-collected dataset consisting of all toehold acquisitions reported to the SEC from 1995 to 2015 to document a strong herding reaction of active equity mutual funds after toehold announcements. This herding reaction is several times stronger than other mutual fund herding events reported by previous literature. I also document that the strength of the herding reaction varies depending on the identity of the filer or the characteristics of the firm acquired. The herding reaction is stronger for toehold announcements of firms with a smaller market capitalization, better growth opportunities, and those that are more illiquid. I also find that the herding reaction is weaker after the filings of hedge fund managers. My results support the informational herding cascade hypothesis.
Identifier: FA00013127 (IID)
Degree granted: Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018.
Collection: FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection
Note(s): Includes bibliography.
Subject(s): Information asymmetry
Mutual funds
Herding
Held by: Florida Atlantic University Libraries
Sublocation: Digital Library
Persistent Link to This Record: http://purl.flvc.org/fau/fd/FA00013127
Use and Reproduction: Copyright © is held by the author with permission granted to Florida Atlantic University to digitize, archive and distribute this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Use and Reproduction: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Host Institution: FAU
Is Part of Series: Florida Atlantic University Digital Library Collections.